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The Permit Power Meets the
Constitution
Richard A. Epstein*
The proliferation of government regulations must count as one of the
most obvious social trends of the past generation. The new wave of
regulation works in many ways and across many different substantive areas.
Sometimes it works by way of fines and inspections; sometimes by taxation;
and sometimes it works by the issuance of permits. That last power-the
permit power-is the subject of this essay. Although this power has become
the focal point of enormous public discontent, it has received scant
attention in the academic literature. In this case, however, silence is not
golden.' The frequent war stories about the number of permits necessary
to construct everything from a dog house in the back yard to a nuclear
power plant are so legion that they should not pass unnoticed in the
rarefied groves of academe. It is important, therefore, to ask how the
permit system should operate in principle, how it operates too often in
fact, and what, if anything, could be done to improve the situation.
Intelligent legislation to simplify the permit process is always welcome, for
no provision in the Constitution compels the government to issue permits
before allowing individuals to go ahead with their business. While we
cannot (and should.not) strive for a permit-free society, I think we should
move much closer to that end than we presently are. Hence the question:
Does anything in the broad contours of the Constitution push us in that
direction?
One's attitude toward the permit power is heavily influenced by one's
attitude toward individual liberty more generally. An old observation of the
German system of freedom is that all which is not permitted is prohibited
(which is at least better than what I take sometimes to be the modern
American position that all which is not prohibited is required). The
classical American view generally took the form that all that is not
prohibited is permitted, which sets the initial presumption in favor of
liberty-not in favor of government action. Even the choice between
maxims, however, does not capture the full stakes of a responsible debate
over the uses and limits of the permit power. The two maxims in question
set certain presumptions of what may be done in the presence of
* This paper is a somewhat expanded version of the Fifth HughJ. Tamisiea and Frank
Tamisiea Lecture which I delivered at the University of Iowa College of Law on February 17,
1995. David Currie and Elizabeth Garrett offered helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
1. For one such collection of anecdotes powerfully stated on all manner of social ills, see
Phillip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense (1994).
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government silence. They act, therefore, as default rules that deal with the
short-term problem of government inaction. They do not act as
constitutional rules that correspond to what Congress or the states can do
when they are primed for action. Hence, the question devolves to one of
power, not one of inertia.
Surely, however, a dose connection exists between setting the initial
presumption and using the permit power. Knowing that the classical
presumption in favor of liberty holds, for example, in the area of speech,
one could easily infer that government efforts of prior restraint are
destined to run afoul of the First Amendment, even if these restraints are
not viewpoint specific. 2 The initial political presumption transmutes itself
imperceptibly into a substantive constitutional norm, which is played out as
a prohibition against federal action. The presumption in favor of liberty,
however, is far weaker with other kinds of permits, such as those regulating
the ability of people to enter into various kinds of businesses, or to use
their property as they think fit. Here, no one should be surprised to learn
that the Constitution as construed gives the government virtually unlimited
power to require permits before many forms of economic behavior are
permitted.
When stated in this form, the issue has a nice doctrinal ring to it.
Should the doctrine against prior restraint in speech cases, as developed in
the formative constitutional era, be carried over to all permits generally, or
should it limit government powers only in the area in which it arose?
While I see a somewhat larger role for permits with business than with
speech, this proper area is not as large as it might appear from consulting
the current statute book. Requiring permits comes as easily to government
as breathing under water does to fish.3
This Essay proceeds in four stages. Part I compares tort damage under
a strict liability system with the ordinary injunction, and shows why the
latter is a far more potent remedy that has to be hemmed in with strong
limitations, as it usually is in ordinary tort litigation. Part II then compares
the private injunction with the public permit and shows that the latter is
subject to none of the limitations that apply to tort injunctions, and that
nothing in the special status of government requires a relaxation of these
standard limitations in the regulatory context. Part III then makes the
modest point that, though the permit power may be a valid legislative tool,
it does not make the state a part owner of the regulated venture. Finally,
part IV examines the recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
in Nollan v. South Carolina Coastal Counci44 and Dolan v. City of Tigards

2. See, ag., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937) (striking down municipal
ordinance that required permission of city manager for leafletting and pamphletting).
3. See, eg., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (dealing with
the dredge and fill permits needed under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972
prior to engaging in any activities on a wetland).
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. 114S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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insofar as they place some limits, whose contours are as yet undefined, on
the power of the state to condition the permits that they grant on the
willingness of the individual citizen to surrender otherwise protected rights.
This entire discourse does not take place in a vacuum, but presupposes a
strong theory of individual rights that form the backdrop for both private
law suits and government regulations. In one sense, this Essay could be
interpreted as an extended argument that Mr. Justice Holmes was wrong in
Lochner v. New York when he said that the Constitution embodied no
substantive theory of the relationship between the individual and the
state.6
I. STRICr LiABim VERSUS INJUNCTIONS.
Before diving into such heady waters, I must explain why permit
powers are prized by governments and feared by individuals subject to
them. Consider, first, the private law analogue to the permit: the
injunction, which is rarely issued, and when it is, usually appears in
disputes among neighbors. The contrast between the injunction and tort
damages, even under a strict liability system, demonstrates the injunction's
potency. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company,7 a staple of the torts literature,
neatly ilustrates this distinction. At issue in Turner was whether the
defendant was strictly liable in tort when water leaked out of a cistern
located in the Texas desert. The water was needed for the drilling
operations of the defendant's business. The Texas court recoiled against
the prospect of allowing damages under a strict liability system, fearing this
remedy would shut down a necessary and profitable industry for the state.
In doing so, the court made a Texas-size claim. By way ofjuxtaposition, an
earlier New Hampshire case, Brown v. Collins s rejected the strict liability
rule in tort-there when a horse bucked when frightened on a public
way-by appealing to the Bible itself. ChiefJustice Doe went so far as to say
the rejection of a strict liability rule in tort was necessary for the
preservation of civilization itself.9
Today, in landowner disputes, the strict liability rule is in the
ascendancy because of an increased concern with the preservation of the
environment, yet civilization surives. The key element, here, however, is to

6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
8. 53 N.H. 442, 449-50 (1873) (citing Exodus for the Hebrew support of a strict liability
system thought to be inappropriate for nineteenth century America).
9. Id. at 448:
Even if the arbitrary test [of Rylands v. Fletcher] were applied only to things which a
man brings on his land, it would still recognize the peculiar rights of savage life in a
wilderness, ignore the rights growing out of a civilized state of society, and make a
distinction not warranted by the enlightened spirit of the common law:. it would
impose a penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable, skillful, and careful manner, to
rise above a condition of barbarism. It is impossible that legal principle can throw so
serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement.
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show how utterly exaggerated is any claim that the choice between strict
liability and negligence has a pronounced effect on the well being of
society.10 Strict liability has the advantage of defining clear boundaries
between neighbors, at the cost of somewhat greater frequency of litigation.
Negligence carries with it the mirror image of advantages and disadvantages. The dominant feature of both systems, however, is that they induce
defendants to take only costjustified precautions. The difference between
the two systems in terms of the total cost to certain activities is relatively
minor, and dearly civilization at any era of industrial development can do
quite nicely with either of these rules. In switching from strict liability to
negligence, or the reverse, it is not as though the common law courts had
taken leave of their senses and decreed that the victim had to pay the
injurer an amount equal to the damage it suffered at the injurer's hands
(a rule that would have the catastrophic effect that Chief Justice Doe
attributed to Rylands).
The stakes get much higher when the choice is between damages
under a strict liability rule and injunctive relief. In the Turner scenario, a
strict liability rule means that a defendant pays somewhat more in tort
damages and precautions, and somewhat less in legal fees. In contrast, the
injunction, especially the unconditional injunction, shuts down operations
altogether unless the defendant can bribe the plaintiff to release the
injunction, perhaps for a figure fiar in excess of any possible damage that
the plaintiff might suffer. Given this profound shift in the balance of
power, injunctions are usually confined to situations in which there is an
actual recurrent damage or an imminent threat of damage. Even when
issued, such injunctions are normally structured to minimize interference
with the defendant's activities, while protecting the plaintiff's land from
harm inflicted by those activities. One can always protect a plaintiff by
shutting down a defendant's activities (or, for that matter, dosing down all
the oil fields in Texas). Usually, however, injunctions are issued to the
point where damage is sharply reduced, not eliminated; allowing activities
to continue so long as the defendant complies with certain stipulated
conditions. Even here the conditions are usually related to the risk of
external harm. Thus, a well-drafted injunction may instruct the defendant
to keep waste within his land, but it will then allow him to figure out
whether it is cheaper to not generate it at all or to capture it before it runs
onto the plaintiff's land. The wholesale injunction, however, stands in stark
opposition to the strict liability tort action: The tort action is a somewhat
higher tax on activities. The injunction shuts down the activity. With strict
liability, industry profits may drop off by one or two percent, if that. With
an industry wide injunction, industry profits drop off to zero. That
difference is worth worrying about in both Texas and Biblical terms.

10. 1 have discussed this question at greater length in Richard A. Epstein, The Social
Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 Harv. L Rev. 1717 (1982).
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II. INJUNCTIONS VERSUS PERMITS
The injunction, therefore, is a potent device, but the permit is more
potent still. It is worthwhile to attend to the differences between the two as
instruments of social control. Before the permit power is asserted, the
activity may be undertaken freely, though with potential liability in tort,
even under strict liability. In an extreme case, a tailored injunction may
issue to prevent the threat of imminent harm to neighbors; yet even here
courts retain some discretion in the terms required in order to balance
hardships between the parties. Permit powers, however, are rarely softened
by the conditions routinely associated with private injunctions. Rather, the
injunction, however potent, carries none of the clout associated with the
routine grant or denial of a permit.
The first key difference concerns the burden of going forward. In an
ordinary tort action, the injured party must step forward to claim that he is
at risk from the defendant's activity. This simple rule means that the
defendant does not need to obtain permission from any individual or
group before it starts its original activity. Once started, that activity can
only be brought to a halt when there is some clear and present danger of
an invasion of the plaintiff s interest.
In most cases, the defendant will avoid taking that risky course of
action for four related reasons, all of which apply with great strength to
land use cases, in which permits today are commonly required. First, the
informal restraints of neighborliness work as a powerful constraint against
many forms of misbehavior. Pollution usually starts dose to home and
diminishes with distance. Neighbors are often friends, and even when they
are not, they often move in the same social circles and thus are subject to a
wide array of social sanctions when they deviate too far from community
standards of good behavior. These standards, moreover, are capable of
variation across different communities in different settings, so that local
knowledge can be brought to bear in setting the right amount of pollution.
Typically that level will not be zero, as the individual who complains about
pollution in one case will benefit from its creation in the next. In these
situations, "live-and-let-live" is a maxim not only of law, but also of good
social sense.' No one claims these sanctions are uniformly operative or
obviate the need for legal restraints. A weaker proposition, however, is
worthy of support: The stronger the social sanctions in place, the weaker
the need for legal ones.
Second, the informal pressures on landowners to avoid nuisances are
not only social, but often personal and physical. Usually, harm to a
neighbor can only be inflicted by persons who first inflict harm on their
own property. The pollution, erosion, or flooding of neighbors' property
does not occur in a vacuum. Usually water or filth has to run for some
length over a defendant's land before it reaches the plaintiff s. Wholly

11. For the classic statement, see Baron Bramwel's masterful opinion in Bamford v.
Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862).
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without any legal intervention, therefore, the defendant's own land is
hostage to the plaintiffs well-being. While the level of care induced is
admittedly below that which is optimal, the possibility of self-injury imposes
an automatic loss to a defendant that no amount of legal maneuvering can
avoid. This physical constraint, therefore, acts as a weak but useful buffer
for the benefit of others in the neighborhood.
Third, in addition to the self-inflicted harm, the defendant always
remains at risk of tort liability for damages he causes. Once again, this
threat is more potent in the land use context than it might be with, for
example, hit and run drivers. Land cannot move, and it is nearly
impossible for a defendant whose conduct is a source of pollution, erosion,
or flooding to conceal those offensive activities. Happily, the land itself
offers a kind of security for the right of action, so that at the margin
insolvency is a less pressing risk than it is in automobile accidents.
Fourth, injunctive relief under the tort system still offers a potent
threat to neutralize the benefit of investments in ongoing operations. The
defendant, therefore, has a strong incentive to avoid trouble under the law
of nuisance or trespass, for the decision to shut down activities after the
costs of investments are incurred has large adverse consequences. The
decision, therefore, to delay the interposition of legal remedies until the
threat of harm is imminent does more than simplify the process of
adjudication. It removes the power of the state to blockade activities before
they begin. All tort law is a balance between freedom of action on the one
hand and risk to person and property on the other. No tort rule can
simultaneously reduce both risks to zero. The best that can be done is to
minimize the sum of the expected costs from both types of error, taking
into account their anticipated frequency and severity. For the reasons
stated, the risk of premature legal invasion is often far greater than the risk
of tardy legal invasion. The common law rules on nuisance may not have
been perfect, but they did come close to striking the proper balance.
Permits change this balance. Once the permit is required, the
individual citizen becomes a supplicant before the government in all cases,
whether or not any real threat of harm exists. Huge numbers of cases are
necessarily brought into the system, only a tiny fraction of which would
have resulted in a direct conflict of interest between neighbors. Yet
government at all levels is allowed to hold up operations for an indefinite
period of time, often on the slenderest grounds, because the all-toofrequent presumption of state benevolence imperceptibly eases the
standards necessary to enjoin certain forms of private action. The permit
may be denied by a state regulator who does not have to show that an
applicant's conduct puts other persons at risk, and, in fact, does not
require any of the showings that are necessary for obtaining private
injunctions.
In addition, the permit powers are strictly cumulative. The ability of
the state to issue one permit with respect to one type of hazard in no way
limits the power of the state to require a second permit for a different type
of hazard arising from the same activity, and then a third, etc. Permits,
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unlike judicial decisions, are typically issued by specialized bodies which
often have a strong ideological position on the issues that come before
them time after time. No longer can one be confident of going before a
judge who is selected not solely for his views on the question of, for
example, wetlands and environmental damages. Rather, the ostensible
expertise of agency personnel is little more than a pretext for a strong onesided commitment which results in a complete inversion of the proper
distribution of power within a legal system. Neutral judges have only
limited powers to issue injunctions, but interested administrators have an
absolute power to issue or deny permits. It is therefore a mystery why any
court should defer to a process so rife with the possibilities of mischief. But
that mischief has its clear consequences; the succession of permits required
could easily consume resources that exceed the commercial value of the
undertaking subject to the permit power.
The question then arises regarding what might justify the creation of
this enormous power in the state. One possible explanation relates to one
inherent weakness in the private injunction, which takes the form of a
familiar collective action problem: Who should seek injunctive relie?. In
the simplest situation, conceive of a defendant whose pollution activities
could injure one, some, or even all of twenty neighbors. If the pollution is
discharged, the injured parties, once identified, have an incentive to bring
suit for the harm suffered. But which of these parties is the obvious
candidate to maintain a suit for injunctive relief before harm occurs?
Acting individually each neighbor is likely to make a familiar self-interested
calculation: "Why should I incur all the costs of providing for an injunction
when the probabilities are that someone else wil benefit from the
prevention of harm?" That selfish calculation is generally correct. If the
injunction costs $100 and provides $200 worth of social benefits to the
neighbors, no individual neighbor whose probability of suffering that $200
of harm is under 50 percent would rationally seek that injunction himself.
While in principle, it is possible to pool expenses to obtain that injunction,
the familiar litany of coordination and holdout problems will likely scuttle
that enterprise before it takes place.
This predictable impasse opens an opportunity for useful government
intervention. The virtuous government will tax all the neighbors their pro
rata share of the cost and then bring the suit for injunctive relief, if
necessary. If it is lucky, it can recover its expenses and then use them to
fund the next round of activity. In this optimistic scenario, the mere fact
that a credible threat of legal action exists is likely to deter anyone from
committing the harmful actions that might trigger it. I will ignore for the
moment all practical complications in apportioning costs, setting tax levels,
and setting a regulatory course of action. Even if one concedes that these
may be done well, we still fall short of adopting the present permit system.
The government power to tax allows many diverse citizens to act as one
party. But if the appropriate balance in the simplest case-that with one
potential defendant and one potential plaintiff-allows the plaintiff to
obtain an injunction only on some showing of imminent peril, the state,
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when acting for all citizens, should be in no better position. It too should
have to show the same level of peril as the individual citizen. The basic
task-to minimize the sum of over and under-enforcement of injunctive
relief-does not disappear because the government has injected itself into
substantive litigation. And that balance is not set by allowing the state the
prerogatives that it typically claims for itself.

III. PERMITS AND OWNERSHIP
If the arguments set out above are correct, then the permit power
should be far more circumscribed than it is today. Unfortunately, the
alchemy of government intervention has led to a very different legal
position, under which the permit power requires individuals and businesses
to receive their government's blessing before they are allowed to act. This
enormous power reserved to the state requires some elaboration, for no
matter how generous a view one takes of the permit power, one still must
distinguish between the state as regulator and the state as owner. Quite
bluntly, the power to issue a permit does not-or at least should
not-make the state a part owner of the property. It is always necessary to
distinguish between a permit power and a (co)ownership right, although
one suspects that, more often than not, government officials cannot tell
the difference between them. While a permit gives the government a
limited power to prevent certain kinds of use of property, it does not give
the state the power to undertake its own use of the premises. (However, it
is usually allowed to enter land without consent to ensure that the
conditions of any permit, once issued, are respected by the parties to
whom they are issued.)
To put the matter in this form is not to suggest that all is well with
the permit power. The existence of these permits creates a real holdout
problem for which there is no consensual solution. The government may
not use the property, but it can freely block the use of property by its
common law owner. So the next question concerns how that standoff can
be resolved in a responsible fashion. To answer that question one has to
look at the various risks associated with the permit power.
First, the permit power invites, indeed almost requires, an elaborate
set of administrative procedures, which lays out the reasons for which the
permit may be granted or denied and the set of procedures that must be
followed in order to obtain the permit in question. In many cases, the state
understands that there are ostensible substantive limits to the permit
power. The state knows, for example, that it cannot tell landowners that
they must get a permit simply to walk on their own land, and knows it
could be subject to potential financial penalties if its refusal to grant
permits results in the permanent deprivation of all economically viable use
of the land.' 2 So astute administrators recognize that there are costs to
12. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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both blanket objections and to final decisions that open them up to
judicial review. The net effect, therefore, is that the permit waltz takes
place, in which the government officials act as close to owners as they
possibly can without crossing that magic line by imposing controls on all
possible uses of the land. One fine technique, therefore, is to grant
permits, but to subject them to conditions that are in practice so onerous
that it is not worth going through with the project in ight of the
restrictions on behavior."3
The second technique is to delay the issuance of the permit. In one of
the Supreme Court's least lucid moments, it stated that there is really no
reason to be upset because a permit is denied so long as that decision is
4
subject to review in the ordinary course of business. More process is
equated with due process. Under the Court's reasoning, the permit could
ultimately be granted. So long as there is hope within the administrative
system, the courts remain closed to those who must have a permit in order
to proceed with their business. The Supreme Court makes it appear as
though the internal administrative processes for getting permits were set by
some extra-political forces in some finite and manageable fashion, so that
there is always a final decision at the end of a speedy and responsive
process. But there are no exogenous variables in the perpetual battles
between permit provider and permit seeker. The government now finds to
its delight that if its objective is to slow development, or to keep a new firmn
out of business, all it need do is extend the due process rights within the
system ad infinitum. If at one time a land use board did not have a
procedure for variance, then that can quickly be added. The application
can be allowed so as to keep the landowner or other claimant out of court,
and then, when it is denied, an additional appeal can be afforded. This
ensures that due process becomes a blanket to suffocate, not a route to
speedy and prompt review in the courts. At each stage in the procedure,
the government can manufacture delays by allowing additional time:
additional time for argument, for permit administrative officials to take
summer vacations, for site inspection, or to ask for further documentation
of changed conditions since the last set of delays. Justice delayed is
development denied and the status quo affirmed.

13. just this transformation took place in Lucas, id., as the 1990 amendments to the
Coastal Commission Act set up an obstacle course that, on its face, did allow some
development to take place.
14. See Williamson County Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)
(requiring variances to be sought before allowing judicial review). The Court's attitude toward
its own quagmire is blas6 in the extreme. The Court has stated that, "[A]fter all, the very
existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner
free to use the property as desired." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 127 (1985). The costs of delay are assumed to be zero, and this entire line of argument is
in evident tension with First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987), which treats temporary takings of real property as compensable events under the
takings clause.
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This is a racket (no lesser word will do) whose dangers the Supreme
Court fully recognizes in the context of free speech by private citizens and
organizations. The law imposes a virtual prohibition on any prior restraints
of free speech precisely from the recognition that the permit (or license)
system exerts far more leverage than a damage action, which is tied to the
level of harn suffered. But with occupational liberties, such as the effort to
introduce new communications technology before the FCC, the dominant
maxim repeats all too often, "better safe than sorry." The status quo
receives a blessing that places entrepreneurial activities at risk
A third feature of permits also calls for some attention. The correct
operative principle should be that once a permit is granted it stays granted
absent some powerful demonstration of changed circumstances that pose
some imminent threat. In most cases, however, this is not the rule. The
government that grants a permit reserves, expressly or impliedly, the right
to revise that permit at will, even after people act in reliance on the
government action. In one case from personal knowledge, a fire
department allowed construction of a new school extension with fire doors
that were not tied electronically to remote parts of the same large
complex. The system was designed and constructed in ways that met all
applicable safety standards. Three weeks before school began, the
inspectors returned to the building and decided that a fully integrated
system linking all doors in the building was required. After school began,
the doors therefore could not remain open until the new connections were
retrofitted at great expense. Yet the clanging of doors disrupted classrooms
and posed a serious risk of injury to small children who could be hit by the
large swinging doors operated by other children, whose first concern in
hurrying down the corridors was not safety. Since none of those risks was
within the purview of the fire department, the school was left to scramble
and spend money in order to reduce the total risks that were increased by
a change in permit standards.
Unfortunately, legal doctrine is not equal to the social problem, for
the government, which created the permit power unilaterally, is allowed to
reserve the right to revoke at will, contrary to the principles of detrimental
reliance that dominate the law of contracts.' That outcome is all the
more questionable because the individual citizen does not voluntarily
choose to subject itself to the permit power in the first place. In ordinary
markets, if you don't like the terms that people offer, you can go
elsewhere. But there is no effective exit right when the state asserts its
permit power. The state, which has a stranglehold on individual behavior,
must be told to relax its grip. 1 It is hard to see why this is not required by

15. For one application of this principle, see Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers,
191 U.S. 379 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (holding that a promised tax break could be revoked after
the railway line had been built because the railroad had not obligated itself to build the
railroad in the first place). The case turned on a narrow reading of the consideration
requirement, which demanded that the undertakings on each side be "conventional
inducements" for each other. Id.
16. For my analysis of this problem, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State
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the simple guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. Any standard that is consistent with
the rule of law must be both known and stable. The current system
requires neither.
The permit power in the hands of government is also dangerous for
other reasons. One prominent risk is the utter lack of substantive standards
by which permits can be denied. The need for the demonstration of any
real harm is often dismissed as a relic of the old common law, and in its
place, licenses and permits are granted or denied under a standard that
asks whether or not the applicant's activity is in the service of the public
interest. Yet it seems evident as one watches the mountains of paper that
accumulate in the cabinets of the FCC that the public interest is rarely
served by techniques that administrators use to measure it directly." This
open free-for-all strongly contrasts with the much more focused inquiry
used in ordinary actions for injunctions, in which the question is the
crossing of some clearly demarcated boundary. Yet in the environmental
area, the perimeters of state action are pushed back such that any
alteration of the earth is regarded as a potential source of harm which has
to be reviewed and scrutinized before it can occur. 18 Often, however, the
substantive standards under which permits are issued-the original contour
requirements of the strip mining acts come to mind' 9 -increase the level
of real environmental damage by forcing landowners to attempt the
impossible without allowing them to respond forthrightly to old-fashioned
risks of erosion or pollution of public and private lands and waters.
A fourth technique that draws the permit web ever more tightly is the
large number of local, state, and federal permits routinely required for a
simple project. That tripartite division of power creates a distinct obstacle
in its own right and carries with it the immense potential for exhaustion
and delay. Further, it also opens up for state agencies other forms of
strategic behavior that threaten our basic fidelity to the rule of law. For
instance, suppose that both federal and the state governments must issue
permits for someone to fill in a wetland (or at least what some government
official calls a wetland). This creates a nice sequencing problem. Each
agency is tempted to say, 'We will grant you a permit only after all your
other permits are in line." After all, why should any government agency
have to go through an unnecessary review when the new project may never
get off the ground? The procedures translate into the area of admiistra-

(1993).
17. For the early version of this critique, see Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2J.L. & Econ. 1 (1959).
18. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1973), with its elaborate
system of permit provisions, and powerful criminal sanctions for their violation. For a recent
dispute over the proper scope of the statute as it relates to the protection of habitat, see
Sweet Home Chapter for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
19. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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tive action the same "why me?" ritual that is par for the course in joint
causation cases. Let A, B and C harm X jointly and each is able to say,
"Don't blame me because it all would have happened even if I had done
nothing." So A points to B, who points to C, who points to A, who is quite
happy to continue to go around the circle a second time. If no one has to
process a permit first, nothing need ever get done. To avoid this impasse,
all permits should be considered on their own merit; the question of which
is reviewed first and why should not be left to the unhappy citizen who has
to struggle with them all. Hiding behind other permit requirements to
avoid passing on a particular application should not be raised to an art
form.
The situation may be far worse than this, for sometimes one gets the
impression that the state and federal officials engage in cooperative
behavior. Only one denial is needed to stop a project cold. It is, therefore,
possible for officials to take turns with each other. First the state party can
allow the action to go through and have the federal government stop it;
then the roles can be reversed. The happy alternation allows each side to
present a relatively impressive record of accommodation, even though the
bottom line is that no project wiggles its way through the entire obstacle
course. Notably, this situation is aggravated because one cannot chase after
the federal officials in state court, while the federal courts are loath to
review the action of state courts-since these can be reviewed in their
home base. So not only is there a divided process of passing on permits,
there is no obvious judicial forum which can see the full picture at one
time. And so the cycle of delay continues uninterrupted.
This maze has grown ever more complex under the approving gaze of
the federal and state courts. The protection of property against takings is
quite limited in those areas in which there is no physical occupation, so
that permits are not subject to much scrutiny by the courts. Often times
the entire body of law can be summarized in the jurisprudence of
"developer loses," which one thoughtful study treats as the major reason
for the run-up in housing projects in California. 0 The relaxed attitude of
the Supreme Court allows the states wide latitude in defining the ends for
which permits are granted, the means to achieve those ends, and the
ability to assess the relative risks of moving too quickly (which are always
great) and moving too slowly (which are always small). The only way to
attack that permit system is for courts to impose far greater scrutiny on the
selection of ends, on the choice of means to achieve those ends, and even
on the relative hazards of over- and under-regulation. The Supreme Court
has given some hints that it is willing to meet this challenge, but to date
they are only hints that thus far have not been picked up and pursued with
vigor by lower federal or state courtjudges, most of whom give the benefit
of doubt to government action across the board.

20.

WilliamA. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 218-52 (1995).
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IV. NOLLAN AND DOIAN
What hints did the Supreme Court drop, and what do they tell us
about the permit problem? The Supreme Court's only indications of
change come in connection with two land use cases: Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission 21 and Dolan v. City of TigardL. Nollan arose out of an
act of defiance. The Nollans had applied for a permit to demolish a
dilapidated beach house on land they had contracted to buy in order to
erect a more modem home in the same place. The contract of sale was
conditional on issuing a permit for the construction of the new house. The
Coastal Commission was prepared to grant the permit, but only if the
Nollans ceded a public lateral easement across the front of their property.
In one sense, it was a good deal for the Nollans. They were better off with
the combination of bitter and sweet from the state than they were with the
status quo ante. They decided, however, that they were entitled to the
sweet without the bitter. Unlike their more timid neighbors, they were
undeterred when the requested building permit did not issue. After
protracted negotiations and wrangling, they first obtained a writ of
mandate from the trial court for the permit to issue without an injunction,
which the Coastal Commission promptly appealed. While the case was on
appeal, the Nollans took a major business risk. They completed the
contract for purchase, ripped down the old bungalow and started
construction of the new house, without a permit. As befits this saga, they
lost in the California Court of Appeals.2 The case was not heard by the
California Supreme Court, but the United States Supreme Court upheld
their temerity, saying that the demand for the surrender of the lateral
easement was a form of extortion that did not have to be paid. If the state
wanted to take the lateral easement, it could condemn it for cold cash.
Why did the state think it had the power to deny the building permit
in the first place, wholly without regard to the attached condition? This
question is more troublesome than it seems. The Nollans's beachhouse was
no different from any other in the neighborhood. By no stretch of the
imagination did building it count as a common law nuisance. If the permit
had to be denied for cause, then what kind of cause could be shown in
this case? I can think of none, and thus would conclude that simply
denying the permit was a taking of private property, in this case the
development rights over the land in question. If the state does not possess
those rights, then it is hard to see why it should be able to sell back to the
landowners rights that it should not have taken from them in the first
place. In this regard, the case is far easier than the usual case of
unconstitutional conditions, whereby the state may have a right to veto

21. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
22. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
23. 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct App. 1986).
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certain transactions but nonetheless cannot allow them on certain kinds of
conditions that allow the state to exploit its monopoly power.2 4
So why might a building permit be denied? Here Dolan offers some
clues. In this case, the landowner wanted to expand her plumbing supply
store and the adjacent parking facilities. Arguably, this expansion could
have two effects. First, the expansion of the impermeable parking area
could increase the runoff of water into the creek, creating flooding risks
for downstream neighbors. Second, the access rights to the store would be
worth more because of the increased traffic that expansion would bring to
the store. The City of Tigard, in order to pursue the objectives of its own
master plan, sought to capitalize on these two features of Mrs. Dolan's
proposed expansion. It therefore made her an offer she could not refuse.
The city would give the permit for expansion, if Dolan would deed over to
the city land for a bike path and a flood easement over a nearby creek. As
in Nollan, she would be better off with the expansion subject to the
conditions than she would have been if forced to make do with the status
quo. The city, to its benefit, would not have to purchase either the flood
easement or the bike path. It looked, therefore, like a case of mutual gain
through contract.
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that the city did not
have the power to impose this bargain, at least not without an explanation
as to why these conditions should have been imposed. Thus, on remand,
two issues remain. The first is whether the flood easement could be
justified as a means to cope with any runoff from an expansion of the
covered area. The second issue is whether the bike path is needed to cope
with the expansion of traffic. On the strength of the available record, it
seems that the city should lose on both of these disputed issues. And the
reasons stem from a proper view of the permit power.
Start with the flood easement and the parking area. Without question,
if the alteration of the ground cover increases the runoff into the creek,
Mrs. Dolan runs the risk of liability, perhaps under the rule of Rylands v.
F&tcher,2 which has been applied to dangerous activities in Oregon,2 6
including the accumulation of water. And negligence theories of liability
always remain available, even if Rylands does notl This prospect of
liability sets up the possibility of injunctive relief, just as if tie city were a
private owner. On the view taken here, however, the city must demonstrate
imminent peril before the injunction can issue. That showing, of course,
could not be made. Indeed, even under the more relaxed standard of
intermediate scrutiny that appealed to the Supreme Court, the city still
fails to make out its case to withhold the permit. The city's protected

24. For an explanation of how this might be so, see Epstein, supra note 16.
25. L.R. 3 H.L 330 (1868).
26. See McLane v. Northwestern Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635 (Or. 1970); Brown v. Gessler, 230
P.2d 541 (Or. 1951).
27. Brown, 230 P.2d at 541.
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interest is to stop the runoff; the choice for methods for preventing that
runoff lies with the landowner. If she chooses under the circumstances of
this case to use other methods-grading, culverts, etc.-to direct the water
in a different direction, then the city's interest is satisfied and its case for
more control is at an end.
Likewise, with respect to the return traffic from the road, we do not
deal with a question of harm prevention at all, but rather with a disguised
restitution theory for benefits that the city's actions conferred on Mrs.
Dolan. But these benefits are largely to the people who ride past the
plumbing and supply store in order to enjoy a day in the country, not to
those who ride to the store. That change in traffic patterns hardly
constitutes a specialized benefit that inures to Mrs. Dolan from the
expansion. No one would make that claim if the city had wanted to take
the bike path for nothing if Mrs. Dolan had not applied for a permit in
the first place. Since the permit does not give the city any ownership
position over her land, the city does not have the right to hold out for
something better before awarding the permit. The holdout power is
normally the prerogative of ownership, not regulation.
In this light, we can detect a simpler way to look at this case. The
entire permit process is illegitimate. Mrs. Dolan should be able to build to
her heart's content, and then and only then should the city be able to stop
her by showing some imminent peril of harm on the public way. This line
of argument should quite neatly dispose of the flooding portion of this
claim, but it is slightly less dear with respect to the entire question of
traffic patterns. Here the usual common law rule is that all private owners
have an access right to the street, just as all riparians have access rights to
public waters. To push the water analogy one step further, an owner
cannot use her access rights in water to impose a "surcharge" on the
common resource. The same issue is surely raised with land use. If the
expansion were to increase the traffic flow in and out of her store onehundred-fold, then surely some serious issue of land management would
come into play. The messy question of whether she should be charged
some additional sums for highway expansion or additional traffic lights
would be an unavoidable incident of urban growth and planning. On the
facts of this case, however, we do not come within a country mile of that
problem. Therefore, it is the better part of wisdom to leave the hard cases
for a later time, secure in the knowledge that the law sometimes generates
easy cases with which they can be contrasted.
A Modest Revolution
The particulars about Dolan permit some generalization. The cleanest
way to attack the model of the bargain on which the City of Tigard relied
is to make the obvious point that a permit power never gives a government
body a property interest that it can sell to the landowner or to anyone else.
At that point, the entire apparatus of the permit power falls down, so that
the only remaining question is whether some permissible justification exists
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that would allow the government entity to obtain injunctive relief, subject
to the same limitations that are routinely applied to private plaintiffs.
The resulting shift in emphasis is enormous. Removed from the land
use context, it implies, for example, that the Food and Drug Administration cannot hold up drugs indefinitely until it is satisfied that the drug
under review is safe and effective. The right to buy and sell drugs is an
ordinary incident of property and thus cannot be eliminated without
justification or compensation. The correct procedure, therefore, is to
permit all drugs to go on the market as of right, save only for the ability to
remove from the market those drugs which are shown to pose an
imminent peril to the population at large. The state can issue warnings to
its heart's content, because such warnings can be freely ignored by persons
who wish to run the risk or who think that they possess better information
than the lumbering bureaucracies who have a hammerlock on health care.
Private liability for the sale of new drugs remains possible under the law of
contract, warranty, and fraud, but only on the principle of freedom of
contract that is routinely disregarded under today's law of product liability.
A close examination of the statute books would quickly isolate
thousands of other instances of the permit power that should be consigned
to relative oblivion if this modest reformation of the law of permits is
imposed. The Constitution provides explicit protection for private
property; it does not provide for the government powers to limit its use or
disposition on a whim. The only justifications for the limitation on private
freedom are the protection of others against the use of force or fraud and
the provision of a return benefit of equal or greater value to the regulated
parties. Unfortunately, the current law does not contain the proper
alignment between the Constitution and the permit power. Today the
constitutional limitations come out second best in the battle with official
discretion. The changes I have proposed all stem from the belief that ours
is a government of limited powers, and thus are designed to reverse that
priority and to give the Constitution its deserved pride of place. No one
who surveys the current scene could deny the magnitude of the change in
constitutional understandings. But these changes are consistent with the
original constitutional design. These are changes for the better. Shrinking
the size of government, and curtailing the mischief that it creates, are
urgent and long overdue structural reforms that we as a people should not
fear to make.
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